Defeating the Dragon: Taiwan's Victory Over Chinese Disinformation and Insights for the Next EP Elections

On January 18th, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defence issued a press release announcing the identification of no less than twenty-four Chinese aircraft and five Chinese vessels spotted off the Taiwanese coast over the course of twenty-four hours. Against the backdrop of constant tension between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, this demonstration of force is nothing less than Beijing's reaction to the election of Lai Ching-Te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The tone is set.

Bianca Mihailov

Taiwan Elections: A Matter of Power

While Taiwan has long been the target of Chinese disinformation aimed at manipulating public opinion, the recent context of the legislative and presidential elections has only intensified the phenomenon. When analysing Chinese disinformation, the case of Taiwan is particularly relevant, given the permanent pressure surrounding its status, as Beijing does not recognise the island's sovereignty.

Chinese efforts of influence have been prominently intensified since 2016, when Tsai Ing-Wen and the DPP came to power, seen as an obstacle to a rapprochement with China. With the general elections approaching, the Taiwanese authorities were well aware of Beijing's threatening shadow. Held on 13 January, the 2024 presidential election presented a major challenge as President Tsai Ing-Wen completed her second and final term in office. The election of a new leader of the Republic of China was a major opportunity for China to try and steer the outcome of the vote in favour of a candidate in line with China-favoured ambitions. 

Beijing’s inference: tools, channels and narratives

With its sophisticated modes of action, Beijing relied on a multiplicity of actors to propagate its messages. It is relevant to note that, unlike Russia, China relies on a strong human workforce and little on automated means, like bots. Instead, human users reunited in troll farms infiltrating social media, together with the contributions from actual influencers, represent a much more effective course of action. On top of this, all kinds of pressure, from military to economic, were used to spread Chinese views. Chinese campaigns of influence were supported by dedicated media, Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China and cyberarmies, among other players in Beijing’s network. 

This coordination of actors produced, spread and amplified content favouring Chinese views. The DPP was clearly targeted as the enemy to defeat, seen as independentist and undermining Beijing’s view of reunification between the two territories. The main aim of these influence operations was, thus, to undermine trust in the DPP and to steer public opinion in Taiwan towards the idea of reunification with the People's Republic of China, or at least to find temporary support for the time of the elections.  

As classic disinformation campaigns, popular social networks like YouTube, Facebook and TikTok were used as channels of communication to promote conspiracy theories, inaccurate narratives or deepfake videos. The content of these online posts was political and directly linked to the elections to come, as showcased by the deepfake of the DPP Legislator Lo Chih-cheng. This AI-generated video posted online a few weeks before the election displayed the politician in a sex video.

On the other hand, unrelated political topics, such as the imported egg controversy, were carefully manufactured by China, claiming that eggs were deliberately stockpiled in Taiwan in the context of a shortage and price surge. Such fake news aimed to provoke anger among voters and encourage support for the Kuomintang, the opposition party. These varied posts and narratives served the same goal. They attempted to increase polarisation and create political divisions among Taiwanese and tried to destabilise public opinion before the ballot.

Taiwan defeating the Dragon: a coordinated effort 

Lai Ching-Te's victory in the presidential election - however relative, with just over 40% of the vote - demonstrates China's strategic failure. What can Taiwan’s success explain in repelling Chinese disinformation? 

Defeating Chinese campaigns of influence did not rely on fact-checking or media literacy promotion alone. Building its “digital resilience” for years, Taiwan understood early on the importance of its independence. The civil society organisation IORG illustrates this ambition by working on programmes designed to keep the Internet working in Taiwan in case of any Chinese action aiming at isolating the island from the rest of the world. To counter foreign meddling, Taiwan has opted for a multifaceted approach involving both public and private actors to protect its highly targeted population. The government’s massive investments were combined with a wide network of fact-checkers like Cofacts and civil society organisations such as Fake News Cleaner and IORG.

Above all, Taiwan took the lead by emphasising the role of civil society in its fight against disinformation. In 2022, the government has renounced a bill to further regulate content shared on online platforms, in order to protect freedom of expression. This choice makes the active participation of civil society all the more crucial. Familiar with media literacy, Taiwan has empowered its population by allowing Taiwanese to identify distorted information and detect Chinese practices to counter Beijing’s campaigns of disinformation. Ultimately, Taiwan's most ingenious response has been to make this systematic suspicion of the media an integral part of its culture.

In the run-up for European Parliament elections, what lessons can we learn?

In a year marked by elections in the EU and across the globe, valuable insights can be gleaned from the Taiwanese experience. It is now pragmatic to affirm that disinformation is a major threat to Western democracies, and that it fairly contributes to the turbulent times the EU is currently going through. While the newly released Digital Service Act has attempted to revitalise Europe's fight against the risks associated with digital technology, the results have been far from conclusive.

The 2023 Slovak Parliamentary election is a clear example of the European struggle to repel disinformation. In the run-up to the European Parliament Elections next June, the Commission Vice President Vera Jourova launched in February a ‘democracy tour’ to remind EU Member states of the need to guarantee fair and transparent elections, calling on them to protect our democratic processes by preventing disinformation.

A decisive factor for the upcoming EP election is certainly media literacy. The Taiwanese case once again proves its crucial role, which we are already seeing the positive results of in Finland, for instance. The EU must work to bridge the gap in media literacy between its member states. By raising awareness and empowering its population, the EU would confer an active and crucial role to civil society in the fight against disinformation.

On another note, there is something to learn from the collaborative approach of Taiwan. A coordination effort is needed between the actors involved. As for Internet companies, they need to be held responsible for the information circulating on their platforms. The voluntary and non-binding approach can no longer apply, just as the EU and national governments cannot act alone. Between self-regulation and co-regulation, a hybrid approach needs to be found. To this end, the Digital Services Act introduced in August 2023 still has some way to go.